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Abstract 
While dimensional studies of legislative voting find a single ideological dimension 
(Schneider 1979, Poole and Rosenthal 1985b), regression estimates find constituency and party 
dominant (Kau and Rubin 1979, Peltzman 1984), and ideology secondary (Kalt and Zupan 1984). 
This paper rescales the dimensional findings to show their improved classification success over the 
null hypothesis that votes are not unidimensional. With the rescaling, most votes are not explained 
by one dimension, and several dimensions are important 
Nevertheless, fewer dimensions are found than constituents' preferences suggest. Thus a 
model is developed where transactions costs of building coalitions reduce the number of dimensions. 
When legislative parties build internal coalitions to pass and defeat bills, voting on randomly drawn 
bills has a single party-oriented dimension. And natural ideological dimensions are reinforced if 
parties write bills and logroll along natural lines of cohesion. 
Testing Theories of Legislative Voting: 
Dimensions, Ideology and Structure 
[T]he most common and durable source of factions has been the . . .  unequal distribution of 
property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests . . .  A 
landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser 
interests, grow up of necessity . . .  and divide them into different classes. The regulation of these 
various . .  .interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and 
faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. (Federalist #10) 
1 .  Introduction 
Recently, dimensional studies of aggregate roll-call voting have found a single left-right 
ideological dimension (Schneider 1979, 1987; Poole 198 1; Poole and Rosenthal 1985a, 1985b).1
However, regression estimates of roll-call votes have found that constituency and party dominate 
(Kau, Keenan and Rubin 1982, Peltzman 1984, 1985), although ideology is an important secondary 
factor in some studies (Kalt and Zupan 1984, forthcoming). These results are contradictory: either a 
single variable or dimension explains voting or it does not. 
Both approaches create biases by the questions the ask of the roll-call data. Dimensional 
studies describe outcomes, while regression studies try to explain outcomes in terms of underlying 
causes, particularly constituency. Most regression analyses neglect structure, including party, rules, 
and vote-trading, and neither approach analyzes structure's effect on voting or outcomes.2
Section 2 develops the two approaches in a spatial frame work, and illustrates opposing 
results with an example. Sections 3 and 4 show how the assumptions of dimensional and regression 
analysis are biased toward opposed findings. Dimensional studies overstate unimensionality largely 
by using a success criterion that overstates both the overall success of the dimensional method and 
the fit of the first dimension relative to later dimensions. A null hypothesis is developed: it shows 
the classification success of unidimensionality when the data are not unidimensional. Adjusted 
success ratios then show the improvement in classification above this level; they are calculated for 
several dimensional studies. Regression studies that omit legislative structure (rules, committees 
and parties), overstate the importance of constituency and understate the importance of ideological 
coalitions. 
Even the adjusted dimensional findings are inconsistent with the constituency model-the 
first dimension is far more powerful than it should be if it represents an issue. Thus a theory is 
needed to show how the issue dimensions are reduced to the dimensionality of roll-call votes. 
Sections 5 and 6 develop such a theory. 
Section 5 shows that parties can minimize transactions costs of organizing bills and 
vote-trades by choosing the party division and set of bills that follows the distribution of legislators' 
preferences. Transactions costs are lowest when voting is limited to one bill, on the lowest-cost 
cleavage. Section 6 shows the benefits of multiple roll-call votes on varying issue cleavages. First, 
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they show constituents that a legislator favors their specific views. Second, legislation is innovation. 
When many issues are tied in one roll-call vote, legislators' preferences on individual issues are 
unknown. Third, legislators can avoid coercion by leaders if their votes are needed on many 
roll-calls. A simple model shows the trade-off of benefits and costs of additional roll-calls. Section 
7 concludes. 
2. Spatial Assumptions and an Example
Dimensional analysis requires an abstract space, defined by theory. Regression analysis 
defines a space a priori, usually with many dimensions, while in dimensional analysis the data define 
the space. 
Regression analysis of voting has followed the economic paradigm of demand and supply. 
The dimensions are variables determining quantity: the prices (or quantities) of all complements and 
substitutes, the price of the good, and income. As the demand for a good "can be expressed as a 
function of all prices and income" (Russell and Wilkinson 1979: 52), in principle there are as many 
dimensions as goods in the economy. Bads like pollution are also dimensions. And, as a good is 
different in each time period, a dimension may be needed for each good in each time period. 
Finally, choices depend upon expectations of the future, so a dimension may be included for each 
good in each potential state of the world. 
Regression estimates of roll-call voting include the demands of constituents and pressure 
groups, implying many dimensions. 3 Unidimensionality seems to require that people desire just one 
good, which seems implausible. 
The statistical rules for deciding which variables to include are quite inclusive: 
Are the variables reasonable on theoretical grounds? Is each variable statistically significant 
(even if it explains only a small share of the variance)? Does adding the variable increase 
statistical power (by an F test)? 
The variable should be included if any question is answered "yes". 
If measurable basic dimensions are not known a priori, techniques can organize data with 
many variables (say, test or survey questions or roll-call votes) into a small number of dimensions 
according to a statistical criterion. Thus the data and the organizing principle determine the 
dimensions. Such techniques include factor analysis, multidimensional scaling, and Coombs' and 
Poole and Rosenthal's unfolding.4
These methods severely limit the number of dimensions: (1) Dimensions are usually found 
by a step-wise method. One dimension is estimated and its explanatory power calculated. A second 
dimension is estimated to fit the remaining errors, and its improvement on the first variable is 
calculated. As with stepwise regression, earlier dimensions are assigned a disproportionate share of 
the explained variation when the dimensions are uncorrelated. Jointly explained variation is 
assigned to earlier dimensions. (2) The dimensions are usually required to be orthogonal, although 
actual dimensions are invariably correlated. This forces later dimensions away from their best fits to 
the data. 
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Dimensional analysis often finds dimensions that seem to represent political and economic 
interests, ideology and so on. 5 That is, the dimensions represent causal factors. They can be 
identified by their correlations with variables like ADA or PAC ratings (Poole and Daniels 1985). 
A numerical example shows how the methods differ. The 7 observations are shown in Table 
1 and Figure 1 .  They could be legislators' bliss points in a two dimensional space or yes ( + 1)  and no 
(-1) votes and abstentions (0) on two bills. Consider them true values which the statistical methods 
try to describe.6
How can the points be fit to a single dimension? Regression could estimate one vote with 
another; with one independent variable, it is like dimensional analysis, except that it minimizes 
quadratic error. The single dimension that classifies best is X = Y with the cleavage Y = -X. It 
correctly categorizes 12  of the 14 votes, counting abstentions that are off the cleavage as half correct. 
However, the R 2 for X = Y is zero (SSR = 4, while SSR for Y = 0 is also 4). The regression with Y
the dependent variable is Y = .5X, with an R 2 = .25 (SSR = �). But it correctly categorizes only 10
of the 14  votes. (Closeness counts in regression, but not in classification). 
There may be other independent variables, say A, B, and C, which describe the legislators' 
choices. The Y votes are per fectly estimated by the line Y = -A + B + C, implying three 
dimensions. However, regression can overstate the number of required dimensions: since X = -A + 
C, the regression Y = X + B gives a perfect fit. Finally, dimensional analysis fails to fit a second
dimension properly if it is fitted to the residuals from the first dimension (the points off X = Y); two 
lines (X = -Y, X = 0) do equally well, but each leaves one point incorrectly classified. 
Thus, regression finds a different fit than dimensional methods, and it can "find" too many 
dimensions. Dimensional methods, however, can seem more successful than they really are (as with 
the R2 = O!), and they distort additional dimensions.
3. Critique of Dimensional Findings
The finding of recent dimensional studies that one dimen sion explains Congressional 
roll-calls is puzzling. Do citizens and politicians care about only one great issue? Earlier work that 
found several dimensions in Congressional voting can put these results in perspective. 
3 . 1  Multidimensional findings 
The major multidimensional findings are by Clausen (1967, 1973).7 Issue dimensions are
identified a priori; their existence is confirmed by finding that votes are highly correlated within 
each dimension, but have low correlations across dimensions. However, no one has tested the 
relative statistical success of one and several dimensions with this method, by placing these 
dimensions in a higher-dimension space and calculating whether a unidimensional reduction of the 
space would have as good statistical properties as the a priori multiple dimensions. If the policy 
dimensions do capture underlying differences, a single dimension should fit poorly. If the 
correlations across dimensions are high, as Jerrold Schneider (1979, p. 134) found between 
economic issues and foreign affairs and William Schneider (1982, 1983, 1984) reported across 
economic and social issues and foreign affairs, one dimension might categorize votes nearly as well 
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as several dimensions. 
However, multiple dimensions can also have theoretical value, as Figure 2 (Sundquist 1973) 
shows. He uses two dimensions to show how new, cross-cutting cleavages occur in American 
politics. He starts with a one-dimensional cleavage, but then a second (cross-cutting) issue 
develops, causing voting on both dimensions. To show why a specific group of voters realigned, 
Sundquist needs a new issue dimension. But after the new cleavage becomes stable, voting is on one 
dimension. 
Thus, after the New Deal, Southern Democrats faced cross-cutting cleavages, since they 
were allied with Northern Democrats on New Deal spending (Peltzman 1985), while the one-party 
system, civil rights and foreign policy divided them from the North-dimensions separate from 
economic ideology (Collie and Brady 1985). Explaining Southern roll-call votes should require 
both economic and other variables: even if a one-dimensional liberal-conservative scale fits most 
votes, it misses the underlying forces that caused it. 
3.2 A null hypothesis for unidimensional unfolding 
Unidimensional unfolding seems to classify votes very successfully (Poole 1984, Poole and 
Daniels 1985, Poole and Rosenthal 1985a, 1985b, Ladha 1984). But "success" depends upon the 
appropriate null hypothesis: it shows the "success" of the model using data contrary to the model's 
assumptions (Weisberg 1978). We now develop such null hypotheses and calculates their success in 
classifying votes. 8•9•10 
Figure 2 illustrates this approach with two equally important issue dimensions and voters 
distributed equally across all four quadrants; so voters' positions on the two issues are uncorrelated. 
Suppose that there are equal numbers of bills on each issue and voters choose the issue position 
closer to their own. 
While these issues are uncorrelated, if "left" is defined as comer A and "right" is comer D, 
75% of the votes are correctly classified by the B-C cleavage that divides voters into "left" and 
"right". So one dimension gives 75% "success" even though no one votes according to ideology (the 
A-D dimension). 
Thus, a single dimension could correctly classify 75% of votes when there are actually two 
dimensions. Also, while adding a second dimension gives 100% success, the first dimension would 
be credited with 3/4 of the predictive power, and neither dimension is a true issue dimension. 
A null hypothesis has "random" behavior with respect to the model's assumptions. It gives a 
baseline success level, the classification success of the dimensional model when the data do not fit 
the model. We can then know how much more successfully the dimensional model classifies the 
actual voting data. The natural null hypothesis for a single dimension is a perfectly symmetrical 
distribution of votes in two dimensions. It assumes zero correlation between legislators' positions 
on the issues. (As zero correlation is improbable, this assumption is biased inf av or of the 
dimensional estimates: correlation gives higher success for the null hypothesis. Another possible 
null hypothesis is that all correlations are equally probable. Since correlation ranges between + 1 and
-1 and in voting models all correlations are counted as positive, the average correlation would be 
.5.)11 
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Figure 3 shows the null hypothesis with two issue dimensions, orthogonal preferences and 
sixteen legislators. Their "bliss" points, shown as small circles, are distributed evenly around a 
circle in the two-dimensional issue space. Legislators vote for the position closer to their bliss 
point.12 Clearly, the correlation of legislators' positions on the two issues is zero. One bill is now
introduced at each legislator's bliss point; each divides the legislators into two equal groups (as in a 
minimum winning coalition). Thus, each cleavage line passes through the center and the cleavages 
are distributed evenly around the circle, as shown in the figure. With these assumptions, there 
should be no evidence for a single left-right dimension. 
Yet the prediction that bills divide "left" from "right" has 75% success. Arbitrarily, call the 
left half of the legislators in Figure 3 "leftists" and the right half "rightists." 13 (Any other division 
does just as well.) The bill dividing legislators on the vertical cleavage gives a 100% correct left­
right classification: all of the "leftists" are on one side and all of the "rightists" are on the other. The 
bill on the next cleavage has 87.5% correct classification (14 of 16 legislators). The bills on the 
succeeding cleavages have 75%, 62.5%, 50%, and then 62.5%, 75%, and 87.5% success. Since the 
left-right direction is inferred from the data and maximizes correct classification, 50% is the lowest 
possible success ratio. Average classification success is 75%-not far below the unidimensional 
success rates of 81-87% in Poole et. al. (Tables 2 and 3). 
If the legislators' views on the two issues are not orthogonal, but rather have the "average" 
correlation of 50%, a still higher success rate is obtained. Figure 4 shows eight legislators' bliss 
points (*) in a two-dimensional space. Only two bills need be considered, one left-right and one 
up-down. Correlated tastes need not change the success of the left-right cleavage, which is still 
75% (100% on the left-right bill, 50% on the up-down bill). But the most successful single 
dimension is A-B, which gives a cleavage, Y = -X, that correctly classifies 87.5% of the votes.14
If legislators are randomly distributed but bills are not, the predictive success of one 
dimension will increase and its location depends on the choice of bills. So dimensional methods 
identify the distribution of bills as much as the distribution of preferences.15 For a dimension to
show only legislators' preferences, either roll-<::all votes must be distributed in proportion to the 
relative importance of issues, or all bills must be equally important. If many roll-call votes are on a 
minor issue, the dimension's direction is likely to change. 
These points are illustrated in Figure 3. If only pure left-right bills are proposed, 
classification success is 100%. If half are pure left-right and half are distributed equally across all 
alternatives, success is the average of 100% and 75%, or 87.5%. Now, Poole and Rosenthal's 
(1985b) average success for all roll calls is 82.832% (Table 2). If these votes were either perfectly 
left-right or random in two dimensions, 31 % would be on the left-right dimension and 69% random 
[a lOO + (1- a)75 = 82.832]. However, mostly unidimensional votes may not be exactly on that
dimension. In Figure 3 they could be equally distributed on the 100% left-right and the two 87.5% 
cleavages, so their average was 93.75% correct. (lf legislators make mistakes in voting, the same 
result holds). Now, with the same 82.832% correct classification, 42% are on the left-right cleavage. 
Thus, classification success shows the distribution of cleavages on bills, but not the 
underlying distribution of preferences. Schneider (1979, p. 97) emphasizes this point, that Congress 
has a "truncated agenda" that excludes bills that the (liberal) minority prefer. (Bills by all small 
minorities are probably excluded from Congress' agenda, creating a bias toward relatively "centrist" 
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bills or those of the dominant coalition). Actual roll calls are therefore only a small, biased subset of 
those suggested by the underlying preferences, a result VanDoren (1986) shows in detail for energy 
bills. 
An example can show the importance of a truncated sample. Suppose that in Figure 3 there 
is "agenda control" by an individual on the left-right axis, who vetoes bills relatively unrelated to the 
left-right cleavage (Shepsle 1979), leaving only relatively left-right bills. This veto extends to the 
half of the potential bills in Figure 3 that are most orthogonal to the left-right cleavage. Those 
remaining give 87.5% success. 
The null hypothesis has so far used a two-dimensional issue space to evaluate a 
one-dimensional cleavage. However, the underlying issue space surely has more than two 
dimensions. (For example, Poole and Daniels (1985) fit two and three dimensions to roll calls 
without obtaining a perfect fit (Table 3).) In choosing a null hypothesis with more than two 
dimensions, two issues must be addressed: 
1. What is the appropriate number of dimensions?
2. What is the appropriate weighting of the dimensions?
Howard Rosenthal has proposed (in conversation) that an appropriate null hypothesis is an 
infinite number of dimensions of equal importance, for which correct classification should be 50%.16
However, a null hypothesis should be a close and serious alternative to the hypothesis being tested 
(usually 1, sometimes 2 or 3 dimensions). An infinite number of insignificant dimensions is not a 
serious alternative, while one or two or three more dimensions is. So we find correct classification 
by one dimension for fully orthogonal voters in 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 dimensions. Figure 2 showed that 4
voters, arrayed in a square, are enough to solve for two dimensions. This principle is extended to the 
3 dimensional cube and the 4, 5, 6 and 7 dimensional hypercubes: a voter is located at each vertex; 
a bill dividing the voters in half is proposed at each legislator's bliss point, and the classification 
success of an arbitrary left-right cleavage is found. (All cleavages do equally well). The 
calculations are described in Appendix A. (No general formula is evident, and the success ratio does 
not always fall with additional dimensions). The results are 
# of dimensions success ratio 
2 .75 
3 .625 
4 .625 
5 .6484375 
6 .5947266 
7 .5882031 
The average of dimensions 2-4 is .667, which seems a reasonable "few dimension" null hypothesis. 
Alternatively, a bill could be proposed on each dimension. The vertices range from left to 
right; we index them i = 1. .. n for an n-dimensional hypercube. One bill proposed for each 
dimension means one bill for each of the i-indexed vertices. There is one left-right, i= 1, bill, one on 
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the i=2 dimension, one bill two dimensions from the left-right bill on the i=3 dimension, and so on. 
They might be called the "far-left" bill, the "left" bill, the "moderate left" bill, the "centrist" bill, and 
so on.17 Now the percent correctly classified are
# of dimensions success ratio 
2 .75 
3 .75 
4 .75 
5 .75 
6 .7232143 
7 .71875 
Here .75 seems a good null hypothesis for several dimensions. 
If issues vary in importance, we need an index that shows the effective number of issues of 
equal importance. The index used is the standard "numbers equivalent" inverse of the Herfindahl 
index, from economics and antitrust (Jacquemin 1987, pp. 50--53). It is the sum of the squares of the 
individual shares, si: 
n n 
H = L Sj2 With L Sj = 1 
i=l i=l 
For n equally important issues, l/H = n. Thus l/H reduces the actual issues to the number of 
equal-sized issues. 
With issues ranked by size, a hypothetical distribution of issues has a constant ratio � 
between the size of the ith issue, si, and that of the i+ 1th issue. For example, each issue might be 
50% larger than the next; � =  1.5. So si = �s i + 1, � > 1. We can calculate � for some potential
issues. Political issue dimensions could be related to consumption, to industries, or to occupations. 
Their size distributions might approximate the size distribution of political issues. The distribution 
of issues in Congress can also be examined for energy proposals and all House roll calls: 
Issues # of cases � 
Consumption 12 1.51 
Manufacturing Industries 20 1.22 
Industries 9 1.34 
Occupations 16 1.28 
Energy Issues 9 1.32 
House Roll Calls 15 1.41 
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Sources: Personal consumption expenditures for 1985, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Commerce Department. Manufacturing (Major Industry Groups) for 1984, Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers, Bureau of the Census. Industries, 1985, from GNP by Industry, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Department of Commerce. Occupations, 1980, 1980 Census. Energy issues, from 
VanDoren 1986. House Roll Calls, 1985, CQ Index. For specific P's, we now calculate 
hypothetical "equivalent numbers" for some finite cases and an infinite series. For � =  1.5, and n 
issues, l/H is 
# of dimensions: 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l/H 1.9 2.7 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.5 
For the infinite series i=l,. .. oo, l/H = (�+l)/(!>-- 1), giving 
� 1.2 1.25 
l/H 11 9 
1.33 1.4 1.5 2.0 
7 6 5 3 
Thus, even with a large (or infinite) number of dimensions that are not equally important, the 
effective number of dimensions is quite small-iii the range of 3 to 7. 
Perfectly orthogonal data is unlikely; a more reasonable null hypothesis would be random 
draws from orthogonal data, which would have some correlation. If those correlations could be 
calculated, a higher and more precise null hypothesis correct classification would be available. 
Appendix B has some exploratory calculations. 
A different null hypothesis problem exists in studies (including Poole and Daniels 1985), 
that correlate votes with dimensions or voting scales like ADA rating. Such studies must be careful 
to avoid spurious correlations. For example, in Figure 2, there are two bills, one left-right and one 
up-down, with equal numbers of legislators in each quadrant. Suppose that A is considered "left" 
and is opposed to D, so A-D is the single dimension. The correlation between A-D and the votes on 
the two individual bills is .7071, even though the two bills are orthogonal so the correlation between 
votes on the left-right and up-down issues is 0.18 But correlating an average of all votes with
individual votes or other averages, gives high correlations purely as an artifact. Thus Poole and 
Daniels' (1985) .81 correlation between ADA rating and the left-right dimension may not be so 
surprising. 
3.3 Dimensional findings recalibrated 
A natural way to evaluate dimensional findings is by their classification improvement over 
the null hypothesis. Such findings are often placed on a 0-1 scale. If the null hypothesis is 75% 
correctly classified, unidimensional unfolding should do better, measuring improvement as the 
percentage of the previously incorrectly classified votes that are now correctly classified. Thus, a 
reported 80% success rate explains 5 points of the 25 points above the 75% null success ratio, for an 
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adjusted success rate of 20%. (Success below 75% would be evidence against the 75% null 
hypothesis). Recalculations with null hypotheses of 75% and 66.7% are presented in Table 2. 
As unidimensional classification never has less than 66.7% success over a period of more 
than 60 years (Poole and Rosenthal 1985b, Tables 1-4) for a variety of methods and issue domains, 
the 66.7% null hypothesis is not rejected.19 (It is striking that all but two success ratios are between
75% and 90%, which seems very unlikely for a variable with a range of 50%-100%). 
For the 75% null hypothesis, the classification success of one dimension is substantial but 
not dominant; about a third of the votes above 75% are successfully classified. With Ladha's 
unidimensional model, based upon utility maximization with error, 23-27% are successfully 
classified. This is good performance for a single variable, given the many possible determinants of 
legislators' votes. But it leaves most of the votes to be explained by other factors or by random 
error.20 With the 66.7% null hypothesis, a higher success level of around 50% is attained, but it is
not so high that little remains unexplained, as the original numbers implied.21•22
Table 3 recalibrates Poole and Daniels' (1985) reported classification success ratios, and R2 
from regressions of dimensions on interest group ratings. They use the same votes that led to the 
interest group ratings to find the dimensions. As the interest groups choose votes based on the major 
cleavages in the Congress, Section 3.2 showed that a fair null hypothesis is the success of one 
dimension fitted to two orthogonal dimensions with a zero correlation between them. It has a 
correlation of . 7071 with them, and so an R 2 = .5, the null hypothesis for regressions in Table 3. 
For the classification results, the second dimension is moderately important: 4-11 % of 
votes. Interestingly, the first dimension is less successful as high majority votes are eliminated and 
the legislator's votes might affect policy. The regressions show an important first dimension, a 
moderate increase in R 2 from the second dimension, and a small increase from the third dimension. 23
Table 3's results seem similar to those of Ladha and Poole-Rosenthal in Table 2; the regressions 
seem more favorable to unidimensionality. 
Considering all of these findings, Poole and Rosenthal's (1985a) claim to have developed a 
superior technique for finding dimensions remains warranted: the dimension(s) have substantial 
explanatory power. However, the dimensions, particularly the first, are not as powerful as they 
imply. 
3.4 One dimension as a first step 
The unidimensional findings are reminiscent of statistical consumer demand studies. First 
Engel's law was found: as family income rises the share of income spent on food falls-a one­
dimensional analysis. Later, other dimensions were found: socioeconomic class, size of family, 
urban/rural. And demand patterns vary across goods: Engel's law does not hold for steak. 
For Engel curves to be straight lines, and so fit exactly, preferences must be 
homothetic-indifference curves must have the same shape for every level of income, which is 
unlikely (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980:145-158). Nevertheless, in the classic study of family 
budgets (Prais and Houthakker 1955) the pure linear form gives an average R 2 of .81 for the six 
major food categories (p. 95), while a regression analysis with additional variables gives an R 2 of 
only .858 (p. 141). 
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Roll-call analysis could have a similar history. A crucial first dimension has been identified, 
but other dimensions are also being identified. And dimensions should be explained with deeper 
underlying causes. 
Marxist class-based analysis provides another analogy. There are only two classes in a 
conflict: "Which side are you on?"24 Yet some groups are not naturally on either side. Analysis of 
class conflict requires that we explain how these groups choose sides, even if during the conflict only 
two sides can be seen. The legislative majority rule forces two sides on any vote; perhaps it also 
forces coherence in voting along dimensional alignments. 
4. Too Many Dimensions? Regression Analysis
Econometric estimates of roll-call votes use constituency, ideology and structure variables 
to find the cause of those votes. Numerous dimensions are needed to "explain" roll-call votes.25 As 
each variable is a dimension, in principle, there are many dimensions. However the data invariably 
has high multicollinearity, implying that some dimensions are not necessary. The ideology variable 
in the regression studies is much like the first dimension found in the dimensional studies-Poole and 
Daniels' (1985) first dimension correlates highly with the ADA liberalism rating. 
The underlying causal model is that changes in the independent variables cause changes in 
legislators' votes so that the causal factors can be found by significant regression coeffic ients and 
proportion of variation explained. The goal is to identify a structural model of legislative 
decisionmaking, that allows us to identify political equilibrium and to calculate changes in that 
equilibrium due to changes in the underlying parameters: constituency, party, ideology, structure. 
So regression should distinguish among these alternatives, and detennine how much a change in 
each variable affects the outcome. Unidimensionality's value as a structural variable depends on 
whether left-right ideology is an essential explanatory variable. If ideology is important and not 
collinear with constituency or structure variables, ideology is a major independent causal factor. If 
ideology is important but is also largely collinear with constituency and structure variables, then the 
data are basically unidimensional but the underlying causes could be either constituency or ideology. 
And "ideology" may be a legislator's personal beliefs or the result of coalition building (Schneider 
1986, Sections 5--6; Kalt and Zupan forthcoming). 
In Kalt and Zupan (1984, forthcoming), Ladha (1984), Peltzman (1984, 1985), Kau and 
Rubin (1979), ideology is important, but constituency variables are moreimportant.26 Thus, in Kalt 
and Zupan (1984), R2 falls considerably when "liberal ideology" is omitted, but ideology is not 
collinear with their numerous constituency variables.27 Yet Peltzman (1985) claims that "ideology" 
is really just an overall pattern of constituency preferences. Many political and economic data are 
highly correlated. A method that picks out those correlations could find "ideology," while the votes 
were based purely on constituency. 
To estimate roll-call votes with constituency variables, it would seem crucial to use 
constituency variables appropriate to the specific issue. Thus, energy issue votes could be based 
largely on coal, oil and natural gas reserves, jobs and consumption; fann issue votes should be based 
on production of wheat, com, tobacco, etc. (This was Clausen's rationale for defining different issue 
arenas). Perhaps oil reserves explain civil rights, tobacco, and the Chrysler bailout votes as well as 
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do more precisely-aimed variables. If so, it suggests that voting on individual issues in Congress is 
a charade, that just one factor (party, vote-trading, ideology?) really matters, and votes are not 
determined by what constituents or political supporters (or PACs) desire. This seems an extreme 
view. 
Yet regression studies since Jackson (1974) have neglected party leadership despite 
theoretical work showing how important legislative "structure" is to voting (e.g., Shepsle 1979, 
Shepsle and Weingast 1986). Vote-trading along natural coalition lines also changes the relation 
between votes and issues, as shown below. 
Tests of constituency vs. ideology have not yet found if either dominates the other. Since 
previous studies have used tests inconsistent with rational choice, as Ladha (1984) proves, one route 
is to modify the econometric tests to include rational choices and repeat the tests. Still, it seems that 
both ideology and constituency should have independent explanatory power. It is hard to believe 
that ideology or any single factor could completely override the many varied influences of 
constituents and contributors. 
Yet some process seems to reduce that variety, and with it the number of dimensions. To 
see this, compare the importance of the largest dimensions in the dimensional estimates with the 
variables developed to represent constituencies and interests: 
Importance of Dimension 
Dimension Number: #1 #2 #3 
Dimensional Estimates 
75% Null Hyp. 32.2 8.1 
67% Null Hyp. 49.0 6.1 
Regression Estimates 62.4 12.2 2.8 
Constituency variables 
State Pop. 10.7 7.7 6.8 
Energy 29.2 18.6 14.7 
Occupations 16.9 11.8 11.0 
GNP 20.1 16.4 16.1 
Mfg 11.7 11.4 11.2 
Consumption 19.3 15.5 13.5 
House Roll Calls 19.6 15.5 13.3 
It is clear that the dimensional estimates overstate the importance of the first dimension and 
understate the importance of the other dimensions, compared to our estimate of the underlying 
dimensions' importance. The next two sections present a theory of a "stuctural" process that does 
just that. 
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5. A Theory of Efficient Parties
This section develops a model of parties that pass bills efficiently when transactions costs 
are positive. There are two equal-sized parties28 and a symmetrical distribution of legislator bliss
points in a two-dimensional issue space. Parties choose bills. 
Legislators are distributed evenly within a rectangle, as shown by the points in Figure 5. A 
bill proposes a location in the space, x 1, as the alternative to the status quo, x0• Legislators choose
the bill x0orx1 closer to their bliss points. Following Riker (1962), parties propose bills that will
pass by a minimum winning coalition,29 so bills divide the space into two half-spaces by a straight
line that passes through the rectangle's center. 
Parties attempt to maximize their members' net benefits by passing the most desirable 
bundle of bills while minimizing transactions costs. Transactions costs include both a fixed cost for 
each bill and a variable cost that is related to the distance between each legislator's bliss point, xi, 
and the party's position, x1(Koford 1987). If legislators' losses are linear in distance (Enelow and
Hinich 1984), and transactions costs are proportional to losses, the variable transactions costs are 
linear in distance. 
Party equilibrium is shown in Figure 5, for a rectangular space with 60 legislators located at 
the comers of the "city blocks". Transaction costs per legislator are a fixed amount F, plus the 
distance, Di, between Xi and x 1 in city blocks. 3° For example, take F and transactions costs per city
block as 1. 
With alternatives at the median, transactions costs for a bill causing a cleavage on the long 
(left-right) axis are (for each party) LiF = 30 +Li Di = 120 , so party transactions costs, T, are 150. 
The division along the median on the short (up-down) axis has the same transactions costs. If two 
parties were to organize a bill for each dimension, total transaction costs would be 2T for each bill, 
or 4T. But a lower-cost outcome, one two-dimensional bill, with total costs of 2T, should result.31
Since an n-dimensional space can be divided into two equal halves by an n-1 dimensional 
cleavage, even with a large number of issues and dimensions, two parties can divide the n 
dimensions into two equal parts. If the legislators are distributed nearly symmetrically, they can be 
equally divided along all possible cleavages.32
Now, if the status quo is not at the generalized median, but at the center of one of the parties, 
the other party chooses the x 1 that allows a minimum winning coalition. Transactions costs on the
long dimension are LiF = 30 +Li Di = 66, so T = 96. In contrast, transactions costs on the short 
dimension are LiF = 30 +Li Di = 40, so T = 70. Thus, when the two parties have differing
positions, parties oriented on the long dimension have lower transactions costs. 
To generalize this point, whenever parties take symmetrical positions away from the 
generalized median, the lowest transac tion cost parties are oriented along the longest dimension. 
Furthermore, if the status quo is at a diagonal from the longest dimension, the optimal cleavage is 
turned toward that dimension. Figure 6 shows this case. With x0 the status quo, D l  is the natural
party cleavage, but it has transactions costs of T = 84 for each party. A shift toward the vertical 
cleavage can reduce transactions costs. For example, moving to the D2 cleavage saves 4 units in 
transactions costs. The loss of each party's outlying member, who is replaced by a more central 
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member, saves 1. And 3 units are saved by moving the party's position from the point symmetrical 
with x0 to x*, a point 1/2 -e lower, and so closer to the party's center. In such a vote, an alternative
like x* should win, moving the party cleavage closer to the "natural" cleavage. Perhaps this has 
occurred gradually in the former "solid South," or recently in the Rust Belt as it changes from a 
wealthy part of the country to one desiring special assistance. 
When legislators' intensities of preference vary asymmetrically, intense minorities form 
logrolling coalitions. Their transactions costs can be reduced by combining several issues in a single 
bill: more votes can then be cast sincerely, while with separate bills insincere votes must be 
carefully monitored for cheating, and constituents will be disappointed. 
Thus, at long-run equilibrium, with parties maximizing their members' gains, there is a 
"most efficient" cleavage dividing the two parties. Each party is located where the issue(s) that most 
divide legislators also divide the parties. Also, only one vote (on a bundle of all issues) is needed.33
But, while one vote on one cleavage minimizes transactions costs, American legislatures have many 
votes on multiple cleavages, for reasons that are examined next.34
6. Benefits of Multiple Roll-Call Votes
Section 5 showed that a single roll-call vote on a multi-dimensional bill dividing the 
legislators on the lowest trans actions cleavage minimizes transactions costs.35 So only one vote
should occur. Yet the facts refute that conclusion. What makes the number of bills greater than 
one? 
6.1 Explanations for Multiple Roll-Calls 
Three reasons can be provided. First, legislators want not just to pass good bills, but to show 
their constituents that they are doing so. To do this they must vote with their constituents on bills 
that specifically benefit them, not just for the party position. (Most constituents do not want 
"Reagan's robot"-type legislators).36
Second, the party leaders may use roll-call votes to discover the true distribution of 
preferences on bills. Roll-call votes on actual bills, as opposed to informal straw polls or party 
caucuses, may give superior evidence of the legis lators' true preferences. Leaders must trade off the 
value of superior information from additional roll-call votes with the increased transactions costs. 
In general, the leadership wishes to find the optimum that minimizes overall losses. If 
legislators have linear or quadratic loss functions in Di, the distance between the proposal and their 
bliss points, small movements from the optimum will cause small losses. But a small movement 
from a non-optimal point toward the optimum provides substantial gains. If individual roll-call 
votes have a small cost compared to the gains from moving toward the optimum, additional roll-call 
votes have value. If the party leaders know the legislators' bliss points in then-dimensional issue 
space only with error, and the error is reduced by roll-call votes, then there will be some number and 
distribution across issues of votes that will maximize the improved choice of optimum net of 
transactions costs. 37
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Third, legislators want to maintain their independence of the party leadership. A large 
number of individual votes gives the legislators power to defeat the leaders without turning down 
their party's entire legislative platform. Each individual legislator's power relative to the leadership 
is increased by additional roll-call votes. For with parties forming minimum winning coalitions, 
each voter is crucial to success. If legislators defect, either the party's bill will be defeated or 
higher-cost votes must be obtained. Either cost imposes a finite (tit for tat?) penalty upon the 
leaders. 
The legislator's choice of independence is a short-term long-term tradeoff. A legislator can 
more easily vote against the leadership and current self-interest on one bill out of many to show 
independence. That might lead to popularity with other members and to a leadership position later. 
But such independence is difficult if all roll-calls are important to the legislator. Thus the legislature 
makes a "constitutional" tradeoff in making its rules: permitting more roll-call votes increases 
transactions costs but reduces the leaders' power. A similar tradeoff determines whether bills are 
chosen by party leaders or independently (by committees or floor amendments). Transactions costs 
are minimized by central control over bills, but legislators' independence is reduced. 
6.2 Optimal Number and Distribution of Bills: Examples 
This section shows examples of the tradeoff between the choice of the optimal set of bills 
and the transaction costs of additional roll-call votes.38
Roll-call votes can be used to identify the median voter on one dimension. If voters are 
distributed symmetrically on one dimension over a closed interval, two votes are sufficient to 
determine the median. A third vote will pass the median bill. Thus, 3 votes per dimension will 
determine the median. If the cost of a vote is 1 unit, each dimension's votes cost 3 units. 
Now, there could be an infinite number of potential dimensions; they might be distributed 
like the issues of Section 5, with a constant ratio � between the ith largest issue and the i+ 1th. They 
may also be correlated with each other. For example, suppose that � = 1.25 and the most important 
issue has a value of 30. Then only 11 bills will have benefits greater than transactions costs, 
although they have 91 % of the total potential value. 
Combining in a ,single bill several highly correlated issues can provide greater net benefit 
than a bill on each issue. Suppose, for instance, that voting is on one issue dimension, but other 
issues are correlated with it. Then for two issues of value, u; , i= 1,2, and a correlation between the 
issues of a., the net gain from combining two bills is 
-(1-a.)u; + 3, 
with a saving of 3 on transactions costs but a loss from imperfect knowledge of preferences on one 
bill. If (1-a.)ui < 3 for i= 1 or 2, there is a net gain from combining the issues in one bill. Voting 
should be on the more important issue to minimize the losses from imperfect correlations. 
Optimal strategy with two correlated issues in a single bill requires voting on a dimension 
down the line of correlation. The loss-minimizing line should be the regression line through the 
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positions on the correlated issues-an analysis that can be extended to additional issues. 
Finally, several small bills can overcome the transactions costs hurdle if they are correlated. 
Suppose three bills worth 2 each, voting on one dimension, and a =  .5. Then Li Ui = 4, greater than
the transactions costs of 3. 
In principle, knowledge of the underlying issues and their correlations allows the calculation 
of the optimal distribution of issues across bills and the combination of the smaller issues into the 
larger bills. The higher the average correlation among issues, the greater the gains from combining 
issues. 
7. Conclusion
This paper critiques dimensional and regression analyses of legislative voting. Bach's 
success has been overstated. Yet the unidimensional model's success beyond the effects of 
constituencies and issues must be explained. A theory of legislative parties with positive 
transactions costs explains how the number of bills is reduced from that of the underlying issue 
space, and tends toward the single most prominent dimension in that space. 
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Table 1 
Dimensions and Regression 
Case K y_ a � Q. 
1 -1 -1 1 0 0 
2 -1 0 1 1 0 
3 0 -1 0 -1 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 1 0 
6 1 0 0 -1 1 
7 1 1 0 0 1 
<X = -A +C; y = -A + B +C) 
Figure 1 
* 
---- · ------------- · ------------- · ---- x -1 0 1 
* 
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Figure 2 
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Table 2 
Recalibrated Dimensional Findings 
Classification Success 
Study Reported Recalibrated 
Poole-Rose nthal 1985b 
All roll calls 
One di111enaion 
Senate 
House 
< 60% maJority 
Senate 
House 
Ladha 1984 
1977 Senate roll calls 
Linear model 
Non-linear 
Poole-Rosenthal 
Categories: 
Budget general interest 
Budget special interest 
Regulation: 
General interest 
Special interest 
Dome stic social policy 
Defense & foreign policy: 
Budget 
Resolutions 
Government organization 
Internal organization 
0£ Congress
10 Strip-Mining roll calls 
81.632 
84.033 
83.856 
82.498 
80.7 
81.7 
82.3 
79.79 
79.57 
85.99 
80.73 
80.02 
76.23 
83.54 
80.05 
78.71 
Non-linear 111odel 78.15 
Regression 
Esti111ate 
Non-linear model 77.46 
75% base
26.5% 
36.1 
35.4 
30.0 
22.8 
26.8 
29.2 
19.2 
18.3 
44.0 
22.9 
20.1 
4.9 
34.2 
20.2 
14.8 
12.6 
9.8 
66.7% base 
44.8% 
52.1 
51.5 
47.4 
42.0 
45.0 
46.8 
39.3 
38.6 
57.9 
42.1 
40.0 
28.6 
50.6 
40.1 
36.1 
34.4 
32.3 
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Table 3 
R e c al i brated D i m e n s i onal F i n d i n g s : 
P o ole a n d  Daniels 1985 
P r opo r t i o n 0£ R oll-Call Votes S u c c e s s£ully Cla s s i fied 
Reported 
Number 
O n e  Two O n e  
R e calibr ated 
75% ba s e  66 . 7% ba se 
0£ Dim e n sion s  
T w o  O n e  T w o  
H o u s e : Al -2 Al-2 
all v otes 
> 5% mino rity
> 20% m i n o r i t y
> 40% min o r it y
S e n ate : 
all v otes 
> 5% m i n o r i t y 
> 20% min o r ity
> 4 0 %  m i n o r i t y  
8 6 . 9
8 3 . 6
80 . 8
80 . 8
8 5 . 4
8 3 . 3
81 . 5
80 . 9
8 8 . 4
8 5 . 2
8 3 . 3
8 3 . 3
8 7 . 7
8 5 . 7  
8 4 . 2
8 3 . 6
4 7 . 6
3 4 . 4
2 3 . 2
2 3 . 2
41 . 6
3 3 . 2
2 6 . 0
2 3 . 6
5 3 . 6
40 . 8
3 3 . 2
3 3 . 2
50 . 8
4 2 . 8
3 6 . 8
34 . 4
6 . 0
6 . 4
10 . 0
10 . 0
9 . 2
9 . 6
10 . 8
1 0 . 8
6 0 . 7
50 . 8
4 2 . 3
4 2.3 
56 . 2
4 9 . 8
4 4 . 4
4 2 . 6
65 . 2
55.6 
49 . 8
4 9 . 8
63 . 1
57 . 1
52 . 6
50 . 8
R2 0£ Regr e s si o n  R e s u lt s  
All votes 
Reported Rec alibr ated 
. 5  base 
N u m ber 0£ D i m e n s i on s  
O n e  T w o  T h r e e  O n e  T w o  T h r e e 
. 812 . 87 3  . 8 8 7  
A l  -2 A2-3 
. 624 . 746 . 774 
Al -2 A2-3 
. 061 . 014 . 12 2  . 0 28 
Note: Ai-J s h o w s  th e cla s s i£ic at i on s u c c e s s  0£ the Jth 
di m e n sion . 
So u r c e : P o ole a n d  D a n iels 198 5, Tabl e s  6 a n d  6A, Se ction 3. 
4.5 
4.8 
7.5 
7.5 
6 . 9 
7 . 3 
8 . 2
8 . 2
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A pp e ndix A 
For e a c h  n umbe r  o f  d i mensions n ,  t h e r e  a r e  2n legislator s-­
one at eac h v ertex of t h e  n-dim e n s i on al h y p e r cube . The legis­
lators are r e prese nted by vector s ;  t h e  3 d i m e n s i o n a l  c a s e  i s  
Legislator L e f t-Ri g h t  2's bill Cor r e c t ?  
1 0 0 0 L L + 
2 1 0 0 L L + 
3 0 1 0 L R 
4 1 1 0 R L + 
5 0 0 1 L R 
6 1 0 1 R L 
7 0 1 1 R R + 
8 1 1 1 R R + 
A r b i t r a r i ly , legislator s 1 a n d  8 a r e  t h e  e x t r eme left a n d  r i gh t ,  
imply in g t h e  on e-dim e n s i on al cla s s i f i c a t i on s hown . A bill is 
t h e n  p r oposed £or e a c h  o f  t h e  8 leg i slator s ,  a n d  t h e  p e r cent 
classified " correctly " <con s i st e n t  w i t h  t h e  L-R cla s s i f i ca t i on ) 
i s  c a lculate d . For example , leg i sla tor 2's proposal < or 7's 
equivale n t  bill ) , cla s s i f i e s  50% 0£ t h e  leg i slator s cor r ec tl y . 
Beca u s e  of th e h y pe r cube's s ymme t r y , all poi nt s  i = O, . .  ,n 
v e rtic e s  f r om t h e  le f t  v e r t ex h a v e  t h e  s ame s u c c e s s  r a t i o . T h e  
n u m b e r  of p oints i ver tices f r om t h e  left i s  g i ve n  by t h e  
binomial d i s t r ibu t ion . T h e r e  m u s t b e  a p r i n c i ple be h i nd cor r e ct 
cla s s i f i c a t i o n , but wh i le cor r ec t  cla ssif i c a tion f alls f r om 100% 
at t h e  L-R extre m e s  to 5 0 %  i n  t h e  c e n t e r ,  no g e n eral r ule wa s 
foun d . T h e  c alcula t i on s  of cor r ec t  class i f i cation for n = 2-7 
are s h own , for i=0 , 1  • .  n, a nd t h e  t o t al < a v e r a g e>: 
# of d i me n sion s  
2 :  
3: 
5: 
# o f  poi nts 
1 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
4 
6 
4 
1 
1 
5 
10 
10 
5 
1 
% cor r ec t  
1 . 0
. 5
1 . 0
1 . 0
. 5  
• 5 
1 . 0
1 . 0
. 62 5  
. 5
. 62 5  
1 . 0
1 . 0
. 6 2 5  
. 6 2 5  
. 62 5  
. 6 2 5  
1 . 0
Total < ave r a g e) 
% correct 
.75 
. 62 5  
.625 
.6484375 
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# o f  d i m en s i o ns # of po i n t s  % cor r e ct A v e r a g e  
6 :  1 1 . 0
6 . 6 8 7 5  
1 5 . 59 3 7 5  
2 0  . 5
1 5  . 59 3 7 5  
6 . 68 7 5  
1 1 . 0 . 59 4 7 266 
7 : 1 1 . 0 
7 . 68 7 5  
2 1 . 68 7 5  
3 5  . 5
3 5  . 5  
2 1 . 68 7 5  
7 . 6 8 7 5  
1 1 . 0 . 58 8 20 3 1  
T h e  c a l cu l a t i o n s  b y  d i m e n s i on we i g h t  e a c h  d i m en s i on e q u a l l y . 
A pp e n d i x  B 
T h e  a m o u n t  of cor r e l at i on t h a t  i s  l i k e l y  d ep e nd s  u p o n  t h e  
n u m be r  o f  d a t a  po i n t s  a n d  t h e  · n u m b e r  o f  d i me n s i o n s . A v e r y 
l a r g e  a m o u n t  of d a t a  s h o u l d  b e  n e a r l y  o r t h o g o n a l ,  w h i l e s m a l l er 
a m o u n t s  of d a t a  s h o u l d  h a v e  i n c r ea s e d  cor r e l a t i o n s . A s  cor r e l a ­
t i o n f o l l o ws t h e  F d i s t r i b u t i on , i t  w o u l d  be p o s s i b l e  t o  w o r k  
o u t  t h e  d i st r i b u t i on o f  cor r e l a t i on f o r  t w o  d i men s i on s . 
Cor r e l a t i on i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s u c c e s s  r a t i o  f r o m  7 5 %  i n  two 
d i m e n s i o n s , a p p r ox i ma t e l y  as t h e  s q u a r e  of the corr e l a t i o n . F o r  
p a r a l l e l o g r a m s  w i th eq u a l  h e i g h t s  a n d  l en g t h s , t h e  f o l l ow i n g  
w e r e  o b t a i ne d : 
C o r r e l a t i o n 
0 
. 1 2 4  
. 2 4 3  
. 4 4 7  
. 70 7  
S u c c e s s  R a t i o  
. 7 5 
. 76 5 6 2 5  
. 7 8 1 25 
. 8 1 2 5 
. 8 7 5  
P e r c e n t  I nc r e a s e  
o v e r  7 5 %
0 %  
6 . 25 
1 2 . 5
2 5  
5 0  
C o r r e c t e d  
A v e r a g e  S u c c e s s  
3 1 . 3 2 8  
2 6 . 7 5 0  
2 1 . 5 1 8  
8 . 4 3 7  
T h u s , for m od e r a t e  c o r r e l a t i o n s , t h e  c o r r e c t e d  s u c c e s s  r a t i o s 
i n c r e a s e  on l y  m o d e r a t e l y . H o w e v e r , t h e y  r e d u c e  t h e  f i r st d i m e n ­
s i o n 1 s  power c on s i d e r a b l y ; t h e  l a s t  c o l u m n  s h o w s  t h e  a v e r a g e  
s u c c e s s  r a t i o  o f  8 2 . 8 3 2 %  c o r r e c t e d  f o r  v a r i ou s  d e g r e e s  o f  cor ­
r e l a t i o n . 
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E n d n o t e s  
* C o m m e n t s  f r om H o w a r d  R o s e n t h a l , K e i t h K r e h b i e l , J e f f r e y 
M i l l e r , J e r r o l d  Sc h n e i d e r , J a c k  Wr i g h t  a n d  m em b e r s  of t h e  
U S C / U C L A  M i cr oeco n o m i c s Wor k s hop w e r e  v e r y  h e l p f u l . T h e y  a r e  
n o t  i m p l i c a t e d  i n  a n y  o f  t h e  conc l u s i o n s . 
1 .  H o w ev e r , C l a u s e n  a n d  c o l l e a g u e s  a n d  C o l l i e a n d  B r a d y  < 1 9 8 5 ) 
h a v e  f o u n d  s e v e r a l  i n d e p e n d e n t  d i m e n s i on s . I n  h e r  l i t e r a t u r e  
r e v i e w ,  C o l l i e < 1 9 85 ) r e g a r d s  t h i e  v i ew a s  d o m i n a n t . 
2 .  H o w e v e r , l o b b y i n g  a n d  P r e s i d e n t i a l  p o s i t i on h a v e  b e e n  
e x a m i ned . S e e  E . g . , K a u , K e e n a n  a n d  R u b i n  1 9 8 2 . J a c k s o n  < 1 9 7 4 ) 
a n a l y z e s  s t r u ct u r e , b u t  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  w a s  n o t  i m i t a t e d . 
3 .  T h e  l i te r a t u r e  o n  " sp a n n i n g "  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  n u m be r  o f  
d i m e n s i o n s  m i g h t  b e  r e d u c e d  co n s i d er a b l y , b u t  i t  s e e m s  t o  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  n u m be r  o f  f i n a n c i a l  d i m e n s i on s  a l o n e  w o u l d  b e  
i n  t h e  h u n d r e d s  o r  t h o u s a n d s . 
4 .  S e e  C o o m b s  < 1 96 4 ) , P o o l e  < 1 9 8 4 ) a n d  P o o l e  a n d  Rosen t h a l 
< 1 '3 8 5 a , 1 9 8 5 b > .  
5 .  O r , a a  w i t h  L I S R E L , d i m e n s i on a l s c o r e s  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  d e f i n e  
new v a r i a b l e s . 
6 .  C o o m b e ' < 1 9 6 4 , p .  2 1 > r e l a ti o n s  b e t w e e n  p a i r s  of d y a d s , 
c a t e g o r y  I a . 
7 .  C o l l i e  < 1 9 8 5 > r e v i ew s  a d d i t i o n a l  w o r k . W i l l i am S c h n e i d e r  
< 1 9 8 2 , 1 98 3 , 1 9 84 ) app l i e s t h e  m u l t i d i me n s i o n a l a p p r o a c h  to 
r e c e n t  C o n g r e s s e s . 
8 .  C o r r e c t  c a t e g o r i z a t i o n , r a t h e r  t h a n  m i n i m i z i n g  e r r or 
< d i s t a n ce ) , i s  t h e  s u c c e s s  c r i te r i o n u s e d  h e r e , f o l l ow i n g  m o s t  
o f  t h e  d i m e n s i o n a l  v o t i n g stu d i e s . I t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  f o r  
i n h e r e n t l y  0 - 1  v a r i a b l e s . 
'3 .  A n  a n a l y t i c a l l y p r o v e d  n u l l h y p o t h e s i s  f o r  s c a l i n g  a n d  
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